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The Coming Together of 
Astronomy and Economics1
The coming together of astronomy and economics is an unusual and para-
doxical event, no doubt, but nevertheless not entirely random. This can be 
seen in personal aspects, characterising the minds of individuals of many 
talents and broad interests, and certain forms of contact between these two 
fields of knowledge in terms of subject-matter. The latter are only sensed 
today and certainly have not been fathomed yet. Anyway, as regards in-
dividuals, there are many examples, and some are very fine indeed. Two 
such examples shall be discussed below, although there are more. 
In 1526, Sigismund I the Old, King of Poland, resolved to embark on 
a massive reform of the currency system, which had been prepared since 
the beginning of his reign and was to encompass the entire realm. The re-
form, highly desirable for political reasons, was to put an end to the in-
tolerable currency situation that had arisen with time in various lands 
subject to his rule. The situation was particularly grave in the lands of 
Prussia, where throughout the 15th century and later, until the first de-
cades of the next century, the state of currency left much to be desired. 
It was bad during war, but in peace it time it was not much better either. 
There were widespread complaints about the high prices that were en-
countered in all areas of life. People complained not only about the high 
1 Translated from: R. Knapowski, Skojarzenie się astronomii z ekonomią, in: Opuscula Ca-
simiro Tymieniecki septuagenario dedicata, 1959, pp. 128–142 by Tomasz Żebrowski and 
proofread by Stephen Dersley and Ryszard Reisner. The translation and proofreading were 
financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education under 848/2/P-DUN/2018.
Roch KnapowsKi
456 | Roch Knapowski
prices of gold and silver but also food, servants’ and workers’ wages, 
and everything that they needed and used. The reason behind all this was 
the cheapness of money, a fact of which people at large were not aware, 
or to be precise, the process of money becoming ever cheaper or being 
constantly debased or, to put it bluntly, falsified. 
In the Prussian lands, also covering former Polish Pomerania, sil-
ver shillings or solidi had circulated in the times of the Teutonic Or-
der since 1380, that is, two years before the death of Winrich von 
Kniprode, the most powerful of the Order’s Grand Masters, as the basic 
unit of the local monetary system. Originally, 134 pieces were coined 
out of one Chełmno mark (grzywna weighing 191 g), the fineness of 
which was 131/3 łut of silver (831/3%). Since a computational mark was 
always held to have 60 shillings, one mark by weight yielded almost 2¼ 
computational marks. Later, in particular in the 15th century, the coin 
was subjected to continuous devaluation, losing both its weight (by over 
20%) and fineness. As a result, when out of one mark over 700 shillings 
were finally coined, this meant that over 11 computational marks were 
obtained out of it. In the meantime, during the Thirteen-Years War with 
the Order, the Prussian cities of Gdańsk (Danzig), Toruń (Thorn) and 
Elbląg (Elbing), which surrendered to the Polish king, also coined shil-
lings of no better weight or fineness. Towards the end of the 15th century, 
during the times of Grand Master Johann von Tiefen, then a Polish vas-
sal, admittedly, the coining of completely discredited shillings stopped, 
but they stayed in circulation. In their place, the Teutonic Order’s grosz 
began to be issued with the face value of three former shillings. It, too, 
slowly lost its value.
The table, drawing on the work by F.A. Vossberg Geschichte der 
Preußischen Münzen und Siegel von frühester Zeit zum Ende der Herrschaft 
des Deutschen Ordens,2 rightly called the classic work of Teutonic numis-
matics, shows currency relations in the Prussian lands to 1519.
2 A. Vossberg, Geschichte der Preußischen Münzen und Siegel von frühester Zeit zum Ende 
der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens, Berlin 1843.











































































































Coins struck out of 
one Chełmno mark 







































0.1167 13 65 134.45 2 5 235
0.109 13 9½ 142 2 8 24
Konrad von 
Rothenstein 1382–1390 shillings 0.113 13 3 145,8 2 10 9
Konrad von 
Jungingen 1393
6–1407 shillings 0.113 11 14 1561/6 2 10 14
Ulrich von 
Jungingen 1407–1410 shillings
0.114 11 6 161 2 16 12
0.114 10 12 171¾ 2 20 21
Heinrich von 
Plauen
1410–1411 shillings — 7 9 2601/5 4 8 2
1411–1413 shillings  0.107 6 12 2924/5 4 21 3
1413 shillings 0.111 10 — 187.2 3 2 26
Herman Gans 




0.113 6 17 261.9 4 8 23
0.108 6 3  312.9 5 5 5
1414–1416 shillings 0.104 4 3½  479.5 8 — —
1416–1422 shillings 
0.116 8 9 210.8 3 12 10
0.105 8 12 231.3 3 20 15
0.112 8 9 2198/11 3 16 —
3 So-called Richtpfennige.
4 100% fineness = 16 lut of 18 grams each
5 1 computational mark = 24 skojec worth 30 denars each.
6 Konrad von Wallenrod, Grand Master between 1391 and 1393, probably did not strike any 
shillings because there were enough in circulation.
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Paul von 
Russdorf 1422–1441 shillings 0.111 8 3
7/9 229 3 19 18
Konrad von 
Erlichshausen 1442–1449 shillings 0.112 8 2½ 229.5 3 19 24
Ludwig von 
Erlichshausen
1450–1454 shillings 0.104 5 8½ 367,5 6 3 —




0.095 3 12 600 10 — —
Elbląg 0.097 3 12½ 584 9 17 8
Toruń
0.099 3 16 543 9 1 6




1469–1470 shillings 0.093 3 16½ 574 9 13 18
Heinrich von 
Richtenberg 1470–1477 shillings 0.097 3 14 570 9 12 —
Martin von 
Welzhausen 1477–1489 shillings 0.092 3 4 705 11 5 —
Johann von 
Tiefen 1489–1497
shillings 0.092 3 4 705 11 5 —
grosze 0.109 8 6 230 11 10 —
Frederick of 






0.100 8 —5 258 12 185 —7
1515–1519 0.100 7¾ —5 266 13 65 —7
 7 8
Faced with such a currency situation as the one that arose in 1519, 
Nicolaus Copernicus, at that time a canon and administrator of the Warm-
ian Chapter, wrote the first of his two economic treatises, namely Trea-
tise on coins (Tractatus de monetis) and On the estimation of the coin 
(De estimatione monete). Both are short (they consist of only three or 
six pages) but significant. The latter is an elaboration on the former. 
Both give a correct description of the minting methods used hitherto and 
suggest ways of ameliorating the situation. Copernicus reaches back to 
the times when a pound of pure silver represented eight computational 
7 On the basis of documents, the other figures are based on coins.
8 Grosz = 1/20 of computational mark
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marks (or four Chełmno marks), with the alloy containing silver and 
copper in equal shares9, next he mentions shillings in which only one-
fourth was silver and one pound was reckoned to represent 16 computa-
tional marks erat in his quarta pars dumtaxat argenti et –arc. XVI libr. 
argenti continebant, then he provides the alloy proportions and the value 
of shillings coined by Prussian cities crevit pecunia multitudine autem–
on bonitate, cepitque IIII partibus eris quinta argenti misceri, donec 
pro – arc. XX libra argenti purissimi emeretur and finally he makes an 
emotional statement: Decrescebat ergo in dies magis ac magis estima-
tion pecunie – posterior et pejor semper priori inducta estimationem 
precedentis oppressit et exrusit, donec estimation solidorum et grosso-
rum valor coequaretur; et marc. XXIIII leves pro libra cedant argenti; 
necdum cessatur usque in presens. – Quid restat, nisi ut proxime marc. 
XXVI libra argenti ematur. – Tantis ergo vitiis laborant prussiana mo-
neta – soli aurifices ejus – erumnis fruuntur –; colligunt enim ex promis-
cua pecunia antiquam, – plus semper argenti cum moneta recipients ab 
imperito vulgo. Utinam reformentur hec, dum tempus, est, ante ruinam 
maiorem, ut saltam ad XX marc. libra argenti restitueretur10. As the best 
principle of coining good money, Copernicus thus recommends that it 
should be coined at one place, not in the name of a single city but the 
entire country pursuant to an inviolable decree (decreto inviolabili) and 
that a pound of pure silver should not be reckoned to be an equivalent of 
more than 20 computational marks. Only after 25 or more years could 
the coin be renewed. 
9 Invenio autem ea numismata, Quue nunc grossi vocantur, ali Quando solidos fuisse et mar-
cas VIII Iibram I habuisse purissimi argenti Copernicus refers to the computational mark 
with the word marca, while the ounce (Chełmno) mark is referred to as ½ pound or 2 given 
marks as a pound ubicum, Que marca dicetur, numerum intellegi volo; pro pondere vero 
libram nominabo, Quemadmodum marce II constituuntip sam. cf. in the treatise on coins: 
octo marcae complectebantur libram unam argenti puri alias feinsilber, hoc est duas mar-
cas unciales.
10 This is the famous rule that Copernicus ascertained, stating that bad money drives out good, 
formerly and wrongly called Gresham’s Law in recognition of Sir Thomas Gresham, a fi-
nancial agent of Queen Elizabeth I. 
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In the autumn of the same year, that is 1519, a war with the Teutonic 
Order broke out, and Copernicus, who was personally involved in the 
defence of Olsztyn, stood alongside the Polish king. In order to cover 
the costs of the war, amounting in cash only to over 574,000 marks, the 
Grand Master, Albrecht of Brandenburg, ordered that all church silver 
and gold vessels be confiscated and turned into coins, thereby flooding 
the Prussian lands with grosze of the worst quality. Coined in 1521 to 
pay soldiers, eight-grosz coins contained only one łut of silver each, 
while, there were 528 groszy to a Chełmno mark (i.e. 4,224 groszy as 
units) of the total value of 2111/5 computational marks. After a truce of 
four years was agreed in Toruń on 7 April 1521, grosze of the former 
type of the fineness of 7¾ łut, weighing however slightly less (0.095 
instead of 0.100; there were 270 pieces to a Chełmno mark of a total 
value of 13½ computational marks) continued to be coined so the cur-
rency chaos that had reigned for so long in the Prussian lands was by no 
means averted. 
The session of the Sejm held in Grudziądz in March 1522, at which 
Copernicus read out his treatise at the request of officials and deputies 
in attendance, did not bring any positive results, however, because the 
Prussian cities refused to give up the right to mint their own coins they 
had been granted some time earlier. Only the peace treaty concluded 
in Kraków on 8 April 1525 and the homage paid by Albrecht, from 
then on the Duke of Prussia, to the Polish King gave hope for a success-
ful and final regulation of the monetary system. Following these events, 
Copernicus resolved to elaborate on his second treatise on money and 
produced a treatise twice as long as the original one, entitled On the 
minting of coin (Monete cudende ratio), in which historical and theoret-
ic inquiries were expanded upon and practical recommendations were 
consistently developed and adjusted to the conditions and possibilities 
created by the new state of affairs. 
The new version of the treatise opened with an introduction to the 
discussion of general issues that included the two famous sentences enu-
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merating four major causes that, as a rule, lead to the destruction of 
kingdoms: discord, mortality, barrenness of land and corruption of coin 
(discordia, mortalitas, terre sterilitas et monete vilitas). Unlike the first 
three causes, which are obvious, the fourth, comprehended only by finer 
minds, acts perniciously, and not at once, with a single strike, but slowly 
and secretly, so to speak, (non uno impetu simul, sed paulatim occulta 
quadam ratione respublicas everlit). In his historical investigations, Co-
pernicus goes back to the times of Konrad von Jungingen, or the times 
before the Battle of Tannenberg (ante bellum Tanebergense), or even to 
the times of Winrich, when in this entire period shillings were minted 
out of an alloy containing three parts of pure silver and one-fourth part 
of copper, whereas in the times of Heinrich, after the defeat at Tannen-
berg, shillings contained only three-fifths parts of silver and later even 
less, since it was only one-fourth part. Copernicus stresses that the per-
nicious custom of adulterating money has not stopped up to the present 
day consuetudo sive licencia adulterandi, expilandi et inficiendi mone-
tam cessare non potuit, ec in hunc diem cessat. ‘In what state it is today, 
it is a shame and pity to speak’ in quo statu nunc sit, pudet ac dolet 
dicere. The worth of money has fallen so badly that there are 30 marks 
to a pound of silver. If the situation is not remedied (si non succuratur), 
Prussia will be left with only copper coin and foreign trade will collapse 
in its entirety. Experience teaches us that those countries thrive that have 
good coin in circulation, while those with worse languish. Where there 
is good money, there is art, excellent crafts and an abundance of goods, 
but where debased coin is in use idleness, laziness and slothfulness 
abound, while the arts and spiritual culture fall into neglect and prosper-
ity is lost Constat preterea ipsa loca, que bona moneta utuntur, artibus 
et opificibus egregiis nec non et rerum affluencia pollere, ac contra, ubi 
vilis moneta in usu est, ignavia, desidia ac resupinato ocio tam bonarum 
atrium quam ingeniorum culturam negligere arque omnium eciam re-
rum abundantiam interire. An experienced economist and an expert on 
human nature speaks to us in the following poignant sentences: Nondum 
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memoriam hominum excessit frumenta et annonam minori pecuniarum 
numero in Prussia empta fuisse, cum adhuc bona moneta uteretur, nunc 
autem ea vilescente omnium rerum, que ad victum et humanum usum 
pertinent, precium ascendere experimur. Ex quo perspicuum esse po-
test levem monetam desidiam magis altere, quam paupertati hominum 
subvenire. 
Copernicus sees a way out of the grave situation, continuing to main-
tain his previous recommendations — relying strongly on the authority 
of the Polish King — that the coin in the entire territory of Prussia should 
be unified and fully adjusted to the Polish coin. For this purpose, he rec-
ommends that coins for all Prussia be minted in one common mint or, if 
this cannot be done, that at most two mints be established, one for Royal 
Prussia and another for Ducal Prussia. In the former case each coin is 
to bear the insignia of the Prussian lands on one side and those of the 
Duke of Prussia on the other. On both sides, the insignia are to be sur-
mounted by a royal crown Conduceret itaque, unam et commune esse 
in tota Prussia officianam monetariam, in qua omnis generis moneta ex 
uno latere nummismate sive insigniis terrarium prussie signatur ita, ut 
superne coronam supereminentem habeat, ut ex hoc regni superiorita-
tem recognoscat, ex atlero vero latere ducis prussie insigne pre se ferat, 
corona regni similitar incumbente.11 In the latter case, coins for Royal 
Prussia would bear royal insignia on one side and those of the Prussian 
lands on the other, while coins minted for Ducal Prussia would bear 
royal insignia on one side and ducal insignia on the other. Copernicus 
stresses that by a royal decree both coins will have to circulate and be 
acceptable in the entire realm, and adds a meaningful and perspicacious 
remark: Que res ad animorum concilationem et negociationum com-
munionem non parum ponderis est habitura. Of course, both coins will 
11 There are no doubts whatsoever as to the authenticity of this sentence and part of the next 
which are struck out in a later ink in two surviving manuscripts and were omitted from 
many editions of Copernicus works. V. Mikołaja Kopernika rozprawy o monecie i inne 
pisma ekonomiczne w opracowaniu Jana Dmochowskiego, Warszawa 1923, pp. 12, 2; 
V. ibidem, pp. LXXIX–LXXX.
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have to be of the same grain or alloy, of equal value and estimation and, 
being closely supervised by the state authorities (vigili cura primatum 
reipublice), will continuously have to meet the regulations that will be 
issued. Old coins must be withdrawn without fail so that they do not 
‘infect’ new ones. In an added separate chapter on the ratio of silver 
to gold, a certain proposal, given by way of an example, merits atten-
tion. It suggests adopting the former ratio of these metals as a standard, 
i.e. 1 to 11, instead of the actual ratio of 1 to 12, and mint 20 marks out 
of 11/11 pounds of silver. Then, the Polish and Prussian grosz would 
equalise completely, and two Prussian marks would have the same value 
as the Hungarian gold ducat. In his conclusion, Copernicus succinctly 
reiterates in six points, with the precision that only a great mind is ca-
pable of, all his recommendations in the monetary sphere. 
Copernicus no doubt aware that the stability of currency depended 
on sufficiently strong public finance. He did not discuss this question at 
great length, however, because he was interested in the monetary issues 
that had been topical for a long time. Nevertheless, he understood and 
fully appreciated the role of the state and its political stance in money 
matters. Therefore, he placed great emphasis on the authority of the Pol-
ish State and the resolutions adopted on the initiative of its authorities 
for the estimation of the coin. Putting full trust in the strength and re-
sources of the kingdom, he was able to be convinced that the condi-
tions he set to protect the stability of the value of money could be met. 
He knew that the principal condition for attaining this goal was a com-
plete renunciation of any profit from minting money Et quod principes 
utrinque nihil lucre ex monete cussione sentient. Hence such a strong 
a recommendation: ut involabiter et immutabiliter perpetuo observetur, 
quod XX marche dumtaxat et non amplius fiant ex libra una puri argenti, 
dempto eo quod pro expensis opificii deduci oportet and, on the other 
hand, also a warning: ut caveatur a nimia monete multitudi. For both 
conditions can be met only if there is sound finance and a strong state. 
Sufficient and stable state revenue must be supported by specific curren-
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cy, otherwise the value of the revenue will devalue. ‘We shall give the 
King, Our Lord’, Copernicus writes in a letter to Feliks Reich, a canon 
and custodian of the Warmian Chapter, warning against the postpone-
ment of the currency reform, ‘a lot of money, i.e. chaff but where will 
the grain go?’ (dabimus Regi Domino Nostro grandem pecuniam, id est 
paleas, grana autem ubi manebunt?).
The great monetary reform made at the behest of Sigismund I the 
Old was carried out, by and large, in accordance with the recommen-
dations of Copernicus, who actively participated in convocations, dis-
cussions and negotiations in person or by mail for many years. The 
groundwork for the reform was laid in the Constitution for the Prussian 
lands of 17 July 1526 (Article 31) and the resolutions of convocations in 
Elbląg of 7 July 1527 and Malbork (Marienburg) of 8 May 1528. In re-
spect of the Crown, the reform was effected by the mint ordinances 
of 15 October 1526 and 16 February 1528, accompanied by the royal 
decree of 15 February 1528 that re-introduced the gold coin to Poland. 
A decision was made and implemented to unify the monetary systems of 
the Prussian lands and the Crown to the largest possible extent. In par-
ticular, it was decided that once old coins had been withdrawn from 
Prussia, new ones would be minted, namely grosze, shillings and denars 
with Polish insignia and those of the Prussian lands, and they would 
be minted only in a newly-opened royal mint in Toruń (this provision 
could not be implemented in full, and the mints in Gdańsk, Elbląg and 
Königsberg (Królewiec) continued to operate, the former two with 
breaks, though). It was further decided that two Prussian marks would 
constitute one Hungarian florin (ut-duae marcae florenum Hungarica-
lem constituant) and the Prussian grosz would be equal to the Polish 
one (ut grossus Pruthenicus Polonicum aequet). As regards fineness, 
the grosze were to be struck precisely in accordance with the Crown 
standard, that is, out of an alloy containing 6 łut of silver and 10 łut of 
copper, or to put if differently, a half-pound Kraków mark would yield 
96 grosz; moreover, one Hungarian florin, equal in value to the Polish 
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one, was to be an equivalent of 30 grosz (of 18 denars each). However, 
instead of the latter original ratio, Copernicus recommended the ratio of 
at least 40 grosz to one florin, since it better corresponded to the reality 
of that time.12 The monetary system in Poland and in the Prussian lands 
stayed at this level (about 45 grosz), i.e. in a generally good state, for 
about fifty years . This is yet one more argument for calling those times 
the Golden Age – as they are commonly known. 
The example of Copernicus being capable of applying his mind to 
various sciences and problems, apparently distant in terms of magnitude 
and weight, but in fact closely related, was not isolated. Four hundred 
years later, when the newly founded Republic of Poland witnessed an 
acute and prolonged currency crisis after the First World War, another 
kindred mind emerged, one no less inquisitive, and capable of pursuing 
broader interests. 
The origins of the decline of the Polish currency after the First 
World War can be traced back to the economic and political legacy left 
to us by the three Partitioning Powers waging war, in particular the most 
powerful one—the German Empire. Upon the outbreak of war, Ger-
many began to direct an ever-greater share of its available resources 
towards world-scale political goals. These policies increasingly affected 
its economy and society, also impacting the Polish state which was tak-
ing shape as an independent political entity in the last stage of the Great 
War. At the end of the occupation, the German mark and the Polish mark 
were worth more or less half of their face value. Becoming independent, 
not only formally, in the sphere of currency, but at least maintaining the 
purchasing power the currency had at the moment of regaining indepen-
dence, not to speak of the currency returning to its pre-war purchasing 
power, were expected by the public opinion as an absolutely certain 
outcome of the new political situation. Things, however, played out dif-
ferently. As soon as the Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919, 
12 V. A 1526 letter to Ludwik Decjusz, head of the Kraków mint, drafted by Copernicus or 
with his participation. 
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giving Poland international foundations for its independent existence, 
the Polish currency started to lose its value in world opinion. By the 
end of that year most of its value had been lost. The international com-
munity must have been well aware of the greatly insufficient cover for 
the issued notes and coins by the current state revenues. Meanwhile, 
general political and economic conditions did not offer any prospects 
for balancing the economy in the near future. The situation should have 
improved in the following year; at least this is what was expected. After 
the great military campaigns against Soviet Russia in which the fortunes 
of the adversaries swung like a pendulum, taking Polish armies to Kiev 
and the Soviet army to the outskirts of Warszawa, only for the frontline 
to settle somewhere in between, an armistice followed. The conclusion 
of a peace treaty with the neighbour to the east was expected to fol-
low soon after. However, this time round too reality did not live up to 
expectations. 
Leaving aside the protracted peace negotiations in Riga and the un-
certain outcome of the Silesian plebiscite, the economic effects of the 
two wars began to be strongly felt only then, forcing the authorities, 
lacking any appropriate fiscal apparatus, to incur a growing debt to the 
issuing institution. The conviction, bordering on certainty, that the situ-
ation would continue for a long time, had a dispiriting effect on the rate 
of currency exchange. Figures for the early years of independence illus-
trate the state of affairs in the currency sphere at that time. The figures 
come from the work by Edward Taylor Inflacja polska13, giving the most 
thorough picture of these phenomena and problems in terms of their 
historical course and the applicable theory. 
13 E. Taylor, Inflacja polska, Poznań 1926, p. 22.
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Date
Amount of Polish 
marks in circulation 
(million)
Treasury Debt 
in Polish marks 
(million)
Dollar rate index 
(1914 = 1)14 on last 
week of each month
1918
11.11 880.2 —— 1.90
31.12 1,023.8 117.8 2.14
1919
28.2 1,160.0 315 2.53
30.4 1,346.0 575 3.62
30.6 1,784.6 1,125 3.97
31.8 2,466.6 2,525 7.53
31.10 3,723.6 4,375 11.41
31.12 5,316.3 6,825 26.36
1920
29.2 8,303.3 10,775 37.44
30.4 16,027.9 19,375 45.90
30.6 21,730.1 27,625 33.43
31.8 31,058.8 39,625 50.98
31.10 38,456.8 46,925 69.77
31.12 49,361.5 59,625 137.99
1921
28.2 62,560.4 77,125 200.04
1415
Under these conditions, accompanied of course by the soaring prices 
of all kinds of goods, Prof. Tadeusz Banachiewicz, Director of Kraków 
Astronomical Observatory, published in the two high-circulation dai-
lies of the day, namely the Głos Narodu and Kurier Warszawski, his 
programme for improving the monetary situation dated 5 March 1921. 
The programme is brief and succinct, and sets out in a few sentences 
a number of ideas which must have sounded very fascinating at that 
14 Parity: 1 U.S. dollar = 4.21 German marks.
15 The value of Partitioning-Power currencies in circulation at the same time was on 
11.11.1918: 7,119.8, on 30.09.1919: 10,760.3 (maximum) and on 30.04.1920: 1,372.1 mil-
lion Polish marks.
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time. First, it makes strongly worded, correct and incontrovertible gen-
eral comments followed by proposals organized into four points. 
Until state expenses are in equilibrium with revenues, it is not possible to 
maintain a constant value of banknotes. Meanwhile, a stable currency is 
one of the fundamental conditions of prosperity of the country, because 
the unsteadiness of the value of money undermines any credit, prevents 
rational calculation in industry and commerce and, finally, is a major 
cause of social unrest. It has already become a platitude that to cure a cur-
rency, serious reforms in the country’s economy are necessary (raising 
taxes, increasing production, etc.); however, serious reforms need time, 
while a constant measure of value is needed now.
We see the following way out of the present predicament: 
1.  The State allows businesses to conclude contracts in ‘Polish zlotys’ but 
payable (for the time being) in Polish marks. Actually, Polish zlotys are 
issued onto the market.
2.  The State determines on a regular basis how many marks equal one 
Polish zloty; this is done by collecting statistics from various loca-
tions in Poland for market prices (in marks) of food, cereals, clothing, 
footwear, coal, iron and gold so that average prices in Polish zloty be 
constant.
3.  The entire budget of the State, taxes and other fiscal fees, railway tar-
iffs, etc. are calculated in Polish zlotys.
4.  Subscriptions to a state loan in Polish zlotys are solicited, postal saving 
unions also accept deposits in Polish zlotys to be paid in and out in Pol-
ish marks according to a rate of exchange.
Supplementing the above proposals, to counteract a potentially 
sharp a fall in prices, Banachiewicz recommended that a farmland tax, 
railway and postal tariffs and public official salaries be raised from an 
inordinately low level. The improvement of currency could by no means 
substitute other reforms aimed at amending the financial situation. The 
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sole purpose of the endeavour would be to remove the worst symptoms 
of the financial ailment. This in turn would facilitate a change to normal 
economic relations. 
Without going into a detailed assessment of the above proposals, this 
author wishes to observe that it was here that the idea of conducting eco-
nomic settlements in a currency unit that does not actually exist surfaced 
for the first time in Polish or possibly even German articles on business 
matters. In Poland, in 1921, Feliks Młynarski16 recommended that the 
wholesale price index be used as a benchmark for assessing and paying 
taxes and fees. Later on, the supporters of this kind of currency dual-
ism grew in number, in spite of understandable fundamental objections 
among both academics and public officials. In Germany, where inflation 
had not advanced so far until then as it had in Poland (on 1 March 1921, 
one U.S. dollar was worth 61 German marks), Eugen Schmalenbach, 
professor at Cologne University, had been demanding since 1921 that 
balancing be done in gold marks. Two years later, the movement in sup-
port of calculating receivables in gold grew so strong that even a num-
ber of ministries petitioned the Reichsbank to adopt this solution.17 For 
the time being, however, the idea put forward by Banachiewicz did not 
meet with much response from the establishment in Poland, because 
of the prevailing illusion that the unbridled rise of inflation could be 
stopped without much sacrifice in taxation. 
The otherwise important political events that occurred in March 
1921, such as the adoption of the Constitution, the conclusion of the 
Peace of Riga, and the holding of a plebiscite in Silesia, did not affect 
the state of the currency in any significant manner. Yet, in the middle 
of that year, the dependence of the Polish mark on the German mark 
was strongly underscored when the Government of the Reich set out to 
make the first reparation payments and began purchasing high-priced 
currencies wherever it could. At the end of September, the Polish mark, 
16 F. Młynarski, Reforma ustroju pieniężnego, Warszawa 1921, p. 98.
17 H. Schacht, Die Stabilisierung der Mark, Berlin–Leipzig 1927, pp. 49–50.
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however, sharply rebounded in Poland, owing to a one-off levy an-
nounced by the energetic minister of the treasury, Michalski, and soon 
collected. In June 1922, when the revenue from the levy ceased and 
a protracted dispute between the Chief of State and the Sejm began, in-
flation gained fresh impetus, which could hardly be stopped by a gold 
loan issued by the minster of the treasury, Jastrzębski. The dramatic 
events that took place at the end of the year did not help the situation 
either. A table showing the most important figures, again taken from 
the work by Edward Taylor18, gives an idea of how the situation un-
folded until early 1923. 
Date
Amount of Polish 
marks in circulation 
(million)
Treasury Debt 
in Polish marks 
(million)
Dollar rate index 
(1914 = 1) on last 
week of each month
1921
30.4 86,755.3 106,625 195.91
30.6 102,697.3 130,625 494.28
31.8 133,734.2 158,000 666.98
30.9 152,792.1 178,000 1,500.71
31.10 182,777.3 198,500 926.75
31.12 229,537.6 221,000 702,71
1922
28.2 247,209.5 230,600 945.21
30.4 260,553.8 220,000 933.85
30.6 300,101.1 235,000 1,082.12
31.8 385,787.5 285,000 2,103.98
31.10 579,927.7 453,500 3,200.32
31.12 793,437.5 675,600 4,242.10
1923
31.1 909,160 799,500 7,804
Almost two years after the first publication, on 11 February 1923, 
Banachiewicz repeated his proposals, this time in the Astronomical Year-
18 E. Taylor, Inflacja polska, Poznań 1926, p. 23.
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book of the Kraków Observatory for 1923 and added a few comments. 
Having observed that the theoretic Polish zloty had been legally intro-
duced (submitted to the Sejm by the minister of the treasury, Władysław 
Grabski, the programme of financial reform was based on the compu-
tational index zloty), he stressed that the implementation of the ‘pro-
gramme’ had been only fragmentary so far, and as such could not bring 
forth expected results and emphasised that the programme could hardly 
be considered a remedy for the ailment of the treasury. Its purpose was 
to “alleviate the most unpleasant conditions resulting from the ailment: 
the impossibility of saving, the difficulty of cost calculating, high prices 
of many products and foreign currencies, etc.” 
With regard to current developments, Banachiewicz was very criti-
cal about the 8-percent gold loan because it unnecessarily pegged gold 
to Polish marks, which was a very appropriate thing to say and corre-
sponded with the prevailing opinion at that time. He attached greater—in 
a way decisive—importance to deposits in zlotys in saving associations, 
though he believed gold to be an imperfect measure of value at that time. 
The reason behind this opinion was the fact that the price (purchasing 
power) of gold, like that of foreign currencies, was exorbitant in rela-
tion to the Polish mark, for quite understandable reasons in the time 
of inflation. Finally, Banachiewicz censured the government for giving 
industrialists a loan of several dozen billion marks out of the state levy 
that had been collected with a great effort. The charge was fully justified; 
in the situation that prevailed, the loan was tantamount to a donation. 
In order to assess Banachiewicz’s proposals fairly, it is necessary 
to account for the feeling that ran through society at that time. The fall-
ing value of the currency, a situation that had already lasted for years, 
and the extremely high prices of all goods had worn the people’s pa-
tience thin. The Polish mark was becoming ignored and was no longer 
relied on. Hence, any other legal tender, no matter what legal or theoret-
ic objections it raised, was accepted and used to an increasingly broader 
extent. Out of the four points of Banachiewicz’s proposal, the third was 
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no doubt the furthest-reaching and the most radical in its application. 
It provided for the calculation of the whole state budget, taxes, fees, tar-
iffs, etc. in Polish zlotys or changing the entire public economy to a new 
measure of value, which actually did not exist as money. The second 
point was rather of a technical nature, while the other two, important 
in legal and general economic terms, were as a matter of fact optional. 
In public administration, the computational zloty was used in its many 
varieties (budget zloty, bond zloty, and finally, a zloty for credit indexation 
and a general indexation of public revenues). In turned out that although it 
did provide better information on the payment capacity of society than 
budgets expressed in marks that rapidly became obsolete, and guaranteed 
that revenues would be raised as planned, it could not protect fiscal money 
against devaluation before it was expended, when it was still in the state 
coffers. Therefore, when the Polish mark began its disastrous downward 
slide in the second half of 1923, to which the disappointment felt by soci-
ety in the wake of a long and inopportune trip abroad by the minster of the 
treasury, Kucharski, had greatly contributed, the run to get rid of the legal 
tender at any price could not be restrained. It was not capable any longer 
of fulfilling its principal functions as a measure and representation of val-
ue, not to mention its function as a means of capitalisation. The use of the 
theoretic zloty brought about a favourable effect to some extent in 1923, 
in the final stage of inflation, by forcing policymakers to embark as soon 
as possible on a comprehensive fiscal and currency reform and make all 
calculations refer to a stable measure of value, and not a theoretical one 
this time round. 
Analogous events in Germany provided additional guidance on how 
to proceed. There, too, since passive resistance was resorted to in the 
Ruhr Valley in the second half of 1923, inflation had reached the stage of 
currency disaster. At this stage, with the already widespread use of sta-
ble measures of value, sometimes very strange but also interesting from 
a theoretical point of view19, the German mark was repudiated, making 
19 H. Schacht, op. cit., p. 54 ff.
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the stabilization of the currency and financial reform a matter of urgency. 
When on November 15th, thanks to credit in the newly-founded Renten-
bank and the huge but final credits in the Reichsbank, the Reich’s Trea-
sury ceased to incur debt to the latter institution and when on November 
20th, the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar reached 4,210,500,000,000 
or 4.2 billion German marks and was stabilised at this level by the cur-
rency commissioner, Hjalmar Schacht, the German parliament granted 
far-reaching powers to the Reich’s government to improve finances and 
stabilise the currency on December 8th. Interestingly enough, the Presi-
dent of the Reichsbank, von Havenstein, who denied that there had been 
any inflation to the very last moment, by claiming that the Reichsbank 
had never issued more money than ‘was demanded’, died of a heart fail-
ure on that very day. 
In Poland, the German example convinced the previously reluctant 
Sejm, to give the cabinet of Władysław Grabski equally broad but pre-
cisely specified powers by the memorable Treasury Improvement and 
Currency Reform Act of 11 January 1924.20 The Polish mark stabilised 
in the first half of January 1924 at a level of 9.5 (later 9.3) million marks 
to the dollar, while the State Treasury ceased to incur debt to the issuing 
institution only on February 1st. The budget was really balanced even 
later on, that is, only in March 1924. It follows that the currency was 
stabilised only thanks to the conviction that the budget could and would 
be stabilised.21 
It would be fitting to devote a few words to the comparison of the 
theoretic assumptions adopted for the improvement of a currency by 
20 W. Grabski, Dwa lata pracy u podstaw państwowości naszej, Warszawa 1927, p. 26 ff.
21 On 31 December 1923 there were 125 billion Polish marks in circulation, while on 31 March 
1924, 596 billion; the State Treasury was indebted on these two days for 111.3 and 291.7 bil-
lion Polish marks, respectively. The dollar stood at 1.5 and 2.2 billion Polish marks, respec-
tively. The exchange for zlotys took place after the founding of Bank Polski, as is well-known, 
at a rate of 1,800,000 Polish marks for 1 zloty. Interestingly, American ‘greenbacks’ dropped 
to 1/3 of its value in 1862–1864, French pay vouchers and territorial mandates in 1790–
1796/97 to 1/100 or 1/4000, respectively, Roman antoninianuses in 215–270 A.D. dropped to 
1/100 of their value, while drachmas in Roman Egypt up to 380 A.D., after over four centuries 
of constant devaluation, fell to 1/10,000,000 of their original value. 
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Nicolaus Copernicus and Tadeusz Banachiewicz. Of course, their pro-
posals must be judged in terms of their times, environments and circum-
stances. However, there are some general aspects that recommend them-
selves for a joint judgement and enable a comparison. Copernicus’s pro-
posal is based on the bad money rule he discovered. In hyperinflation, it 
might seem that the rule is reversed, that good money drives out bad. As 
Jan Dmochowski has already rightly observed, this view bears only ‘su-
perficial appearances of rightness’. Strong currencies were not in perma-
nent and regular circulation but were assiduously picked out and trea-
sured. However, another objection comes to mind: whereas Copernicus 
is adamant that bad money must be completely withdrawn from circula-
tion if new good coinage is introduced, Banachiewicz clearly tolerates 
the currency being in circulation whose rate falls, in spite of the fact that 
a new one of a stable value has been introduced. However, in this case, 
too, the antinomy is only apparent. Banachiewicz does not suggest that 
a new currency should be put into circulation but only that value should 
be given in a purely theoretic currency, while payment functions are still 
to be left to the currency in circulation. The potential of this ideal cur-
rency, its attractiveness, is so strong in the transition period that it brings 
about the disappearance of the materially existing but bad money and 
forces the authorities to conduct a comprehensive reform. It involves, in 
agreement with the ideas of Copernicus, the withdrawal of a devaluated 
currency and replacing it with a new one of full value. There are also 
differences in the size, form and duration of respective inflations. These 
differences derive also from a different degree of credit development 
and credit technique. In more recent times, the expunction of indebt-
edness was thus an important driving force behind and a result of the 
devaluation of a currency. 
More examples of astronomy and economics coming together could 
be given. To name but a few: Sir Isaac Newton who for many years 
headed the Royal Mint in London and while holding this office, col-
lected valuable experience on fluctuations in the value of precious met-
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als; Geminiano Montanari, professor of mathematics and astronomy at 
Bologna and Padua Universities, the author of the 1683 work La zecca 
in consulta di Stato;22 and Alfonso X, King of Castile and Leon, and 
Germany, who was famous for his Alfonsine Tables (as a student Co-
pernicus always kept them handy), but he was also able to collect taxes 
with great energy and skill, and derived income from minting money. 
Finally, he lost all three of his crowns and fled to the Moors. Last but 
not least, Julius Caesar, who knew the practical side of all fiscal matters 
very well, introduced gold currency to Rome, wrote a treatise on stars 
characterised by great accuracy, and he is still remembered by all as the 
reformer of the calendar. 
Are there any deeper subject-matter associations between astronomy 
and economics? Who can tell with any certainty today? Of course, the 
alternations of night and day and the changes of seasons are astronomi-
cal phenomena, and as such they affect the course of human work and 
the productivity of earth, and thus the entire economy. But this is not the 
point. Rather, it would be interesting to know if also other changes and 
fluctuations spread over a long time, which are so important and char-
acteristic of the general course of economic life, have any connection 
with the phenomena observed in astronomy. We know of the view held 
by W. Stanley Jevons, generally rejected by economics, about a causal 
relationship between the frequency of sunspots and economic crises. In 
more recent times, Henry Moore attracted attention with his claim that 
the planet Venus, at 8-year intervals, through terrestrial magnetism, af-
fected the weather and crops. The claim was not definitely opposed by 
Ernst Wagemann, president of the German Institut für Wirtschaftsforsc-
hung.23 Generally speaking, in the most recent times, many economists, 
notably American and Swiss, study the Moon and the Sun intensively 
to draw conclusions about the presumed effects on the economy of the 
various periodic phenomena and the impact of these heavenly bodies 
22 G. Montanari, La zecca in consulta di Stato, Milan 1683.
23 E. Wagemann, Wirtschaftspolitische Strategie, Hamburg 1937, pp. 46–47.
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on the Earth. The last word on this interesting and perhaps deceptive 
subject has yet to be said. However, a detailed discussion of specific 
theories falls outside the scope of this article. 
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